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and Wales 
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Abstract 
This article analyses the current context and the use of the public order offence of 
 ‘ƌŝŽƚ ?ŚĞůĚŝŶƐ ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞWƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?/ƚĞǆĂŵŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƌŽŽƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
statutory offence and the difficulty of securing a conviction following times of public 
disorder due to the nature and interpretation of the wording in s. 1. The article 
identifies, and uses as an example, the perception that football disorder includes 
riotous football fans, although official Home Office statistics on football disorder 
highlight that the offence of riot is not utilised. The ƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇŽĨĨĞŶĐĞŽĨ  ‘ƌŝŽƚ ? ŝƐĂŶ
ƵŶĚĞƌƵƐĞĚ ƚŽŽů ? ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƌŝŽƚ ? ŝƐ ĨƌĞĞůǇ ƵƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĚŝĂ ƚŽ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞ
disorderly behaviour. The article projects to make a recommendation that the factors 
underpinning the definition of riot needs to be re-examined to enable the judiciary to 
interpret s. 1 in a manner that is more practicable. 
Keywords 
Public order, riot, violent disorder, football disorder 
Introduction 
 
In anticipation of the upcoming Federation Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) World Cup, the media will be littered with stories regarding spectator 
behaviour. England fans are deemed to engage in disorderly behaviour at 
 international tournaments more than their counterparts. 1  The popular press 
broadcast incidents of hooliganism in and around international football events, 
particularly advertising where hooligans may possibly engage in such disorderly 
conduct.2 
The common theme linked to the media speculation and reporting of such disorder is 
ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌĚ ‘ƌŝŽƚ ? ?WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂ ‘ůĂƌŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǁŝĚĞ-ranging and 
ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ĂƌĐŚĂŝĐ ƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇ ƉŽǁĞƌƐ ? ?3 deriving from a mix of statutory provisions, 
partly from the common law and partly from the royal prerogative, and is aimed at 
preserving order, protecting citizens and punishing those who are involved in serious 
disorder, like football hooliganism. An individual embroiled in acts of football disorder 
abroad can be convicted in the UK and served a football banning order. These arrests 
and orders are then submitted and statistics are produced on a season-by-season 
basis by the Home Office. The statistics can include the offence of riot, although it is 
absent, despite the portrayal of the behaviour being inextricably linked to that of a 
riot.4 
There is a reluctance within the UK legal system to convict offenders of riot under s. 1 
ŽĨƚŚĞWƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚůĞŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƌƵƐŚĞĚ ?5 enactment of the 
statute in the aftermath of a number of disturbances in the UK, and the behaviour of 
English football spectators overseas. This has left the various state institutions 
involved in the enforcement, investigation and prosecution of the offence of riot, 
struggling to prosecute and prevent riotous actions by groups of individuals due to the 
wording in s. 1. The practicality of using s. 1 has led to very few convictions of the 
offence of riot and most notably absent in the context of football disorder. The courts 
                                                          
1 E. Dunning, P. Murphy and J. Williams, Football on Trial: Spectator Violence and Development in the Football World (Routledge: 
London 1990). 
2 J. Williams, E. Dunning and P. Murphy, Hooligans Abroad, 2nd edn (Routledge: London, 1989). 
3 D. Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest: Rights and Regulation in the Human Rights Act Era (Hart Publishing: Oxford 2009) 
84. 
4 J. Kerr, Rethinking Aggression and Violence in Sport (Routledge: London, 2004). 
5 > ?, ?>ĞŝŐŚ ? ‘WĞĂĐĞĨƵůWƌŽƚĞƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ>ŝŵŝƚƐŽĨWŽůŝĐĞ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ƵƐƚŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞWĞĂĐĞ ? ? ? ? 
 suffice with using public order offences such as violent disorder, 6  affray,7 fear or 
provocation of violence7 Žƌ ‘ďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?8 
Aforementioned, this piece will illustrate that Home Office statistics 9  on football-
related arrests and banning orders10 do not record the s. 1 offence in the 1986 Act, 
ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĨŽŽƚďĂůů ŚŽŽůŝŐĂŶŝƐŵ ? ĂŶĚ ƌŝŽƚŝŶŐ ĂƌĞ often partnered when 
discussing football disorder. The scope of the offence in its present form therefore 
hinders the prosecution of offenders of riot. There is a need to address the emergence 
of the offence incorporated in the 1986 Act and how this framework was developed 
with football hooliganism in mind. The factors underpinning the offence will be 
analysed to highlight the difficulty of utilising the offence in order to serve convictions. 
Most significantly, this discussion will project to make recommendations in respect of 
amending s. 1 to provide a mechanism that can be operated to overcome these 
difficulties. 
Mapping the Emergence of Riot 
 
A series of disturbances in the 1980s erupted into major widespread disorders, 
ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ ƉĞŽƉůĞ  ‘ǁĂƚĐŚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚhorror and incredulity of scenes of violence and 
ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞŝƌĐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?11 These incidents of disorders which originated in Brixton 
ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ĂƌĞ ƉƌŽďĂďůǇ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵŽƐƚ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŽƌĚĞƌ
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?12  ĐŽŝŶĐŝĚŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶĞƌ ?s strikes in 1984 W85. Alongside the political 
unrest, the reporting of hooligan incidents involving football violence increased in the 
mid-1980s. It was often said that English football spectators exported their 
hooliganism more readily than other countries. With football disorder no longer 
occurring over territories inside grounds but had moved to outside of the stadia.13 This 
                                                          
6 Public Order Act 1986, s. 2. 7. 
Public Order Act 1986, s. 3. 
7 Public Order Act 1986, s. 4. 
8 R v Howell [1982] QB 416. 
9 ǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ǀŝĂ ,ŽŵĞ KĨĨŝĐĞ ?  ‘&ŽŽƚďĂůů-ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƌƌĞƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŶŶŝŶŐ KƌĚĞƌƐ ^ƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƐ ?(Gov.uk, 9 October 2013). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/football-banning-orders (accessed 12 November 2017). 
10 These statistics are based on information provided by the UK Football Policing Unit, by collecting statistics from the 43 police 
forces in England and Wales, alongside the British Transport Police on the number of football-related arrests, and collecting 
iŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶĨŽŽƚďĂůůďĂŶŶŝŶŐŽƌĚĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ&ŽŽƚďĂůůĂŶŶŝŶŐKƌĚĞƌƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƌĚƐ ? 
11 L. Scarman, The Scarman Report, 2nd edn (Penguin Books: London) 13. 
12 ^ ?DĐĂďĞĂŶĚW ?tĂůůŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ‘dŚĞWŽůŝĐĞ ?WƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌĂŶ ŝǀŝů>ŝďĞƌƚŝĞƐ P>ĞŐĂĐŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞDŝŶĞƌƐ ?^ƚƌŝŬĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/>: ? ? ?Ăƚ
165. 
13 ^ŝƌEŽƌŵĂŶŚĞƐƚĞƌĞŶƚƌĞĨŽƌ&ŽŽƚďĂůůZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ‘&ŽŽƚďĂůůĂŶĚ&ŽŽƚďĂůů,ŽŽůŝŐĂŶŝƐŵ ? ?hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨ>ĞŝĐĞƐƚĞƌ ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?
Available at: http://www.furd.org/resources/fs1.pdf (accessed 17 November 2017). 
 discussion will use football disorder to demonstrate the inability to convict offenders 
of riotous acts. On the face of it, the offence is an ideal mechanism for prosecuting 
violence and disorder witnessed in and around football stadiums. 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Public Order Act 1986, there were already statutory and 
common law powers readily available for such disorders, such as the Public Order Act 
 ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞ  ? ? ? ?Đƚ  ‘ǁĂƐƉĂƐƐĞĚƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨ ƚŚĂƚĚĂǇ P ƚŚĞ
ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ƚŽ ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ƉŽƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ &ĂƐĐŝƐƚ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ŝŶƚŝŵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ?14 
Nevertheless, the government took the view that the powers available in the 1936 Act 
 ‘ǁĞƌĞ ĐŽŶĨƵƐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ ƐĐŽƉĞĨŽƌ ĂĨĨŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝĐĞ
additional powers to prevent disorder before it occurred and to charge individuals 
ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?15 The sequence of events in the UK from 1974 to 1984, 
incůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝǆƚŽŶƌŝŽƚƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞĂĨŽƌĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚDŝŶĞƌ ?ƐƐƚƌŝŬĞŝŶ ? ? ? ? W85 and 
football hooliganism,16 led to strong recommendations to reform the law to provide 
the police with additional powers. 
 
Lord Scarman, 17  following the Brixton riots, called for recommendations on the 
codification of the common law public order offences put forward by the Law 
Commission in 1983,18  ‘ďǇŐŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝŵƉĞƚƵƐƚŽƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĂĨƌĞƐŚůŽŽŬĂƚ
ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ŽƌĚĞƌ ůĂǁƐ ? ?19 Secondly, after the Heysel Stadium disturbances in 1985 
involving Liverpool football supporters, the European governing body for football, 
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), banned all English clubs from playing 
in Europe indefinitely. It was noted that football riots were deemed to be nothing less 
ƚŚĂŶŽƵƚďƵƌƐƚƐŽĨƐĂǀĂŐĞƌǇ ?ƐŵĞĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĞh< ?ƐƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐĂŶĚŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽďĞ
punished more severely.20 It was with this background that the government published 
                                                          
14 HC Deb 16 May 1985, vol. 79, col. 506. 
15 H. Fenwick and G. Phillipson, Text, Cases and Materials on Public Law and Human Rights, 3rd edn (Routledge: London, 2011) 
1085. 
16 Law Commission, Red Lion Square Disorders, Cmnd 5919 (1975); Law Commission, Report on the Brixton Disorders, Cmnd 
8427 (1981); Law Commission, Criminal Law: Offences Relating to Public Order, Cmnd 123 (1983); Law Commission, Review 
of Public Order Law, Cmnd 9510 (1985). 
17 >ĂǁŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?>ŽƌĚ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ‘dŚĞƌŝǆƚŽŶŝƐŽƌĚĞƌƐ ? ?ŵŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
18 Law Commission, Criminal Law: Offences Relating to Public Order, Cmnd 123 (1983) at para. 5.29 ? to abolish the common law 
offences of blasphemy and blasphemous libel. Abolish the offences of disturbing divine worship or devotions and striking a 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŝŶĂĐŚƵƌĐŚŽƌĐŚƵƌĐŚǇĂƌĚ ?dŚĞǇƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ ‘ĂŶǇĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŽĨĨĞŶĐĞ ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŽŵĞĚŽƵďƚ ?ŽŶƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƐƚŽ
whether they exist. 
19  ?ĂƌŶĂƌĚĂŶĚ/ ?,ĂƌĞ ? ‘WŽůŝĐĞŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞZƵůĞŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?D>Z ? ? ? ? 
20 HC Deb 03 June 1985, vol. 80, cc. 21 W33. 
 its White Paper in 1985, namely, Review of Public Order Law.21 It was this that formed 
the basis for the new statutory legislation governing public order, namely, the Public 
Order Act 1986. 
Recommendations were put forward to amend the offences of riot, unlawful assembly 
and affray. The amendments to the offences of riot, violent disorder ? the successor 
to unlawful assembly ? and affray did not affect the overall scope of the criminal law, 
but they were seen to restate the offences in a clearer, more modern language.22 The 
Public Order Act 1986 now stipulates these offences in five sections23 in order of 
seriousness, with ss 1 W3 housing the three more serious public order offences, being 
riot, violent disorder and affray. The three offences do vary in some degree of 
seriousness and in the minimum numbers required, but are significantly linked in 
ƐŽŵĞǁĂǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƵƐĞĚ ?dŚĞĐƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂŶĞǁ ‘ŵĞĂŶƐĨŽƌ
the police to control demonstrations and protests, and for much more stringent 
control and order maintenance outside of pubs and bars, in city centres and near 
football grounds on ŵĂƚĐŚĚĂǇƐ ? ?24For this reason, the 1986 Act was heralded as the 
 ‘ŶĞǁ ůĂǁ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ŚŽŽůŝŐĂŶŝƐŵ ? ?25 providing a mechanism to control unruly football 
ƐƉĞĐƚĂƚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŽŶĐĂƵƐŝŶŐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ?dŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ
law regulating and preventing riotous acts were seen to be not nearly so important in 
terms of controlling football hooliganism and maintaining public order, as the inability 
to actually enforce the law itself in order to secure convictions.26 This inability was 
rebutted, suggesting that evidence illustrated that there were sufficient offences 
readily available to the police, and the courts could already impose heavy sentences 
and serve orders to prevent future public disorder.27 Specific to football hooliganism, 
the new public order legislation would include an exclusion order, 28  aimed at 
individuals involved in public order at football matches who have been convicted of 
one of the new offences in ss 1 W5. Alongside these public order offences, there was 
also the introduction of Schedule 1 that included additional offences relating to 
alcohol at sporting events. 
 
                                                          
21 Law Commission, Review of Public Order Law, Cmnd 9510 (1985). 
22 See above n. 12 at 57. 
23 Public Order Act 1986, Part I. 
24 See Mead, above n. 3 at 242. 
25 HC Deb 13 January 1986, vol. 89, col. 795. 
26 Ibid. at 814. 
27 Illustrated in R v Muranyi [1986] 8 Cr App R (S) 176 with the life sentence of a football hooligan. 
28 Public Order Act 1985, Part IV. 
 The preventative measures including the exclusion of unruly football spectators were 
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂ ‘ďŝŶĚŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶǁŚŽŝƐďŽƵnd over 
can be required to refrain from certain activities for a stipulated period and to be of 
good behaviour. This, similar to an exclusion order, can be imposed in addition to a 
conviction. The power to serve such orders derives from the common law definition 
ŽĨ  ‘ďƌĞĂĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?29 The court must be satisfied that a breach of the peace 
involving violence or an imminent threat of violence has occurred, or that there is a 
real risk of violence in the future. Such violence may be perpetrated either by the 
ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌŽƌĂƚŚŝƌĚƉĂƌƚǇĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ?30 With this in mind, such 
preventative order can be used across the range of public order offences, not just 
specifically to riot. 
The Public Order Offences 
 
With football disorder in mind, having tightened up the offence, it has now reduced 
the chance of securing a conviction of football fans that are involved in riotous acts. 
The definition of the offence was deemed to be housed in a tidier framework, which 
should remove some of the uncertainties at common law.31 A riot is committed when 
 
12 or more people together threaten or use unlawful violence for a common 
purpose in such a way that the conduct of them all together is such as would 
cause a person of reasonable firmness at the scene to fear for their personal 
safety. 
It is immaterial under s. 1(2) whether or not the 12 persons use or threaten unlawful 
violence simultaneously. The common purpose element which must be evident for 
conviction of riot, which can be inferred from conduct32 of the individuals participating 
in the offence, will, nevertheless, very much depend on the facts and circumstances 
                                                          
29 The modern authority of breach of the peace was examined in in R v Howell. It was ŚĞůĚ ?  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨ ƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞ
whenever harm is actually done or is likely to be done to a person or in his presence his property or a person is in fear of 
being so harmed through an assault, an affray, a riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance ? ? 
30  ƌŽǁŶ WƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?  ‘ŝŶĚŝŶŐ ŽǀĞƌ KƌĚĞƌƐ ?  ?W^ ? ? ǀĂŝůĂďůĞ Ăƚ Phttp://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/binding_over_ 
orders/ (accessed 2 December 2017). 
31 See HC Deb, above n. 26 at 797. 
32 Public Order Act 1989, s. 1(3). 
 of each case brought before the courts. Prima facie, the wording of this offence is how 
you could describe disorder witnessed outside of football stadiums when large groups 
of spectators, often with an affiliation for the same football club, are using or 
threatening violence. 
The purpose of stating that 12 or more people committing grave and serious offences 
was highlighted as giving the courts greater sentencing flexibility and reflects the 
gravity of the offence of riot. Therefore, it is correct that it should be defined as one 
of the rarest and least prosecuted offences.33 The creation of these offences was to 
aid in codifying the law and enabling the courts to convict individuals, in particular a 
small portion of football spectators who are intent on causing disorder at football 
matches. Although this can be seen to be practicable, one of the difficulties is that 
people might be caught up in a riot but not have committed an offence. It was 
postulated that all this section will do, at best, is to create new offences for which 
people involved in riots can be arrested, something that was already available.34For 
example, the use of binding over orders that are utilised in respect of the common 
ůĂǁ ‘ďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?
 
Paying particular attention to football disorder, the choice to use such numbers to 
convict an individual of riot comes as a result of the statutory offence of violence 
disorder in s. 2 of the 1986 Act. Section 2 transformed from the offence of unlawful 
assembly in the 1936 Public Order Act, into one of violent disorder that now entails 
the involvement of three or more people. The use of this offence is more prominent 
amongst football spectators embroiled in acts of disorder35 due to the smaller number 
of individuals needed at the scene of the incident. The previous common law offence 
ŽĨƌŝŽƚƚŚĂƚŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ‘ƚŚƌĞĞŽƌŵŽƌĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ?36 were needed to commit the offence 
was abolished by this Act, distinguishing the seriousness of the offence from that of 
12 persons needed, to that of three for violent disorder. Section 2 states that violent 
disorder is 
committed by each person who threatens unlawful violence for a common 
purpose and who intends to use or to threaten violence or is aware that their 
                                                          
33 See HC Deb, above n. 26 at 821. 
34 Ibid. at 804. 
35 2016 W17 Football Banning Order and Arrest statistics illustrate that 21 per cent of the overall arrests are for the offence of 
violent disorder. 
36 Field v Receiver of Metropolitan Police [1907] 2 KB 859. 
 conduct may be violent or may threaten violence37provided that the conduct of 
them all together would cause a person of reasonable firmness at the scene to 
fear for their personal safety. 
It appears that the amendment of these two offences has created somewhat of a 
difficulty. It is therefore a possibility that those, particularly football spectators, are 
being convicted of what should be the offence of riot, but under the remit of the s. 2 
offence of violent disorder. In light of these two statutory offences, there are some 
general factors that constitute to fully understanding how they can be used efficiently, 
particularly in times of football disorder. First, neither of the two offences needs 
someone to be actually to be put in fear for their personal safety. Sherr38 describes 
ƚŚŝƐ ĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ ŽĨ Ă ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂů ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ? ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ũƵĚŐĞĚ ? ? /Ŷ / ĂŶĚ
Another (A.P) and Another v Director of Public Prosecutions,39 Hughes J illustrated that 
 
the person of reasonable firmness...is a hypothetical person. He is often 
ĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶƚůǇƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůďǇƐƚĂŶĚĞƌ ? ?,ĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞ
standard by which the gravity of the behaviour is to be judged and he 
demonstrates that this public order offence is designed for the protection of 
the public. 
With this in mind, neither of the two offences require a third party to present at the 
scene.40 The Law Commission42 before the passing of the 1986 Act stated that the 
offence should deal with persons using or threatening violence such as would cause a 
person of reasonable firmness present at the scene to fear41for his personal safety. 
The government agreed with this proposal for the purposes of riot and violent 
disorder.42 Yet, for each of these offences in thĞĐƚ ?ŝƚŶĞŐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ>ĂǁŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŽďǇƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶŽƉĞƌƐŽŶŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐŶĞĞĚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞ ?ŽƌďĞůŝŬĞůǇ
ƚŽďĞ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞ ? ?43
 
                                                          
37 The mental element to this offence is laid down in Public Order Act 1986, s. 6(2). 
38 A. Sherr, Freedom of Protest, Public Order and the Law (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 1989) 88. 
39 [2001] UKHL 10. 
40 WƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ‘ŶŽƉĞƌƐŽŶŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐŶĞĞĚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞ ?ŽƌůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚƚhe 
scenĞ ? ? 
41 Law Commission, Review of Public Order Law, Cmnd 9510 (1985) at para. 3.17. 
42 HL Deb 16 May 1985, vol. 463, cc. 1276 W85. 
43 See Public Order Act 1986, s. 1(4). 
 With the aforementioned exclusion orders specifically related to football spectators. 
The order could be served if the court was satisfied that making such an order in 
relation to the accused would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection 
with prescribed football matches.44 Section 31 of the Public Order Act stated that an 
exclusion order could be granted if 
 
a. involved the use or threat of violence by the accused towards another person 
and was committed while one or each of them was on a journey to or from an 
association football match; or b. involved the use or threat of violence towards 
property and was committed while the accused was on such a journey 
Considering this and the rationale behind the creation of the statute, the absence of 
a third party with regard to a football spectator created a dilution of the necessary 
safeguards in the respect of the new offences of riot and violent disorder, each of 
which carries substantial penalties. 45 Particularly in light of the case of Kamara v DPP46 
that illustrated the essential requisite of a public order offence was the presence or 
likely presence of innocent third parties not participating in the illegal activities in 
question; it was the danger to their security which constituted the threat to public 
peace and the public element necessary for the commission of the offence. Nowhere 
are these protections more glaringly absent than in ss 1 W2 of the 1986 Act. It can be 
ƐĂŝĚƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚƚŚĞŶĞǁŽĨĨĞŶĐĞŽĨƌŝŽƚĂŶĚǀŝŽůĞŶƚĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌĂƌĞ ‘ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĨĂƌƚŽŽǁŝĚĞůǇ ?
ŝŶ Ă ŵĂŶŶĞƌ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŐŽĞƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?47  If the 
 ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐǁĞƌĞƚŽďĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚĐƌĞĂƚĞ
a more practicable mechanism for securing convictions of riot and violent disorder  W 
particularly in relation to the acts of football disorder that will nearly always include 
aŶ  ‘ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚ ? ƚŚŝƌĚ ƉĂƌƚǇ ? ŵŽƐƚ ŶŽƚĂďůǇ ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞĨŽŽƚďĂůů ƐƚĂĚŝƵŵ Žƌ ŝŶ ƉƵďůŝĐ
places outside of the stadium, that is, town centres and train stations. 
 
As these two offences can be committed in private as well as in public places,48 it has 
been criticiƐĞĚĂƐĂ ‘ƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŽŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĨŽƌĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƐĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĚĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽůůŝŶŐ
                                                          
44 Public Order Act 1986, s. 30(2). 
45 See HC Deb, above n. 26 at 807. 
46 [1974] AC 104. 
47 See HC Deb, above n. 26 at 807. 
48 Public Order Act 1986, s. 1(5) and s. 2(4). 
 ƉƵďůŝĐ ŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?49 It has been suggested that the area needs to have a narrower and 
more rigid approach to be able to uphold a conviction of one of these offences.50 With 
regard to football, as disorder takes place both inside and outside of the stadium. This 
should increase the ability to use the s.1 offence. 
 
With the offences, notably riot, negating the third-party element that is usually seen 
incorporated into the factors of most public order offences, it illustrates the degree of 
difficulty of proving that there is a common purpose with at least another 11 people. 
In a football disorder context, especially with the common perception that disorder is 
created en masse by large groups of football hooligans in and out of the football 
stadia. In order to uphold a conviction of violent disorder or riot, it is for the courts to 
establish whether or not a person deliberately acted in combination with at least 
another 2 people (violent disorder), 11 people for the purpose of riot, or whether it is 
sufficient that at least 3 persons (violent disorder) or 12 persons (riot) are present 
together and are all using or threatening unlawful violence, whether separately or 
collectively. With reference to violent disorder, the Law Commission observed that 
 
ŝŶƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƐŝƚĞŵŝŶŝŵƵŵŽĨƚŚƌĞĞƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞ
is no element of common purpose; nor it is necessary that the three should be 
acting in concert in the sense that they are doing the same acts or doing acts 
directed at the same object.51 
The Court of Appeal in R v NW52 ǁĂƐ ‘ĨŽƌƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?53 by the views expressed by the Law 
Commission with regard to the interpretation of common purpose for a conviction of 
violent disorder. Moore-ƌŝĐŬ>:ĂůůƵĚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŽŶĐĞ
by the courts that the Public Order Act 1986 is to be given its natural meaning and 
should not be interpreted by reference to the common law offences which it 
ĂďŽůŝƐŚĞĚ ? ?54 For that reason he added that 
                                                          
49 See Mead, above n. 3 at 243. 
50 S. Chesterman, Private Security, Public Order: The Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (OUP: Oxford, 2001). 
51 Law Commission, Criminal Law: Offences Relating to Public Order, Cmnd 123 (1983) at para. 5.29. 
52 [2010] EWCA Crim 404 (CA). 
53 E ?WĂƌƉǁŽƌƚŚ ? ‘sŝŽůĞŶƚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:>t ? ? ?Ăƚ ? ?
54 See above n. 53 at 13. 
 ƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ŵĞĂŶƐŶŽŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶďĞŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉůĂĐĞ
at the same time...a group of people using or threatening violence in the same 
place at the same time, whether for the same purpose or different purposes, 
are capable of creating a daunting prospect for those who many encounter 
them simply by reason of the fact that they represent a breakdown of law and 
order which has unpredictable consequences.55 
dŚĞ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŝŶ Z ǀ Et ƐŚĞĚ Ă ůŝŐŚƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ  ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? ĨŽƌthe 
purposes of the offence of violent disorder contrary to s. 2 of the Public Order Act 
1986, but not for the purposes of the offence of riot. It denoted that the phrase 
 ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ? is nothing more than being present at the same time in the same 
place, giving the phrase its ordinary and natural meaning. For that reason, if this 
principle were to be applied in a football disorder context, involving crowds en masse, 
it should help, not hinder a conviction of riot under s. 1. 
 
R v NW also clarified the earlier decisions in R v Mahoof56 and R v Morris,57 whereby 
those committing the offence of violent disorder will be acting with a common 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŝĨƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ŝƐĂďůĞƚŽĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĂ ũƵƌǇƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌƉĞƌƐŽŶƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞ
using or threatening unlawful violĞŶĐĞǁĞƌĞŝŶĨĂĐƚƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƚŝŵĞ ? ? The 
need for a defined common purpose for committing the act whilst not needing a third-
party presence is a strange omission. The nucleus of public order offences is the 
ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ? ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůeffect of that conduct.58 Ǉ ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŶŽ
ƉĞƌƐŽŶŽĨƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐŶĞĞĚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞ ?ŽƌďĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ ?ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞ ?
ĚĞƚĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƚĞ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞĚĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?/ĨƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇƚŽŚĂǀĞĂƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
person, albeit a hypothetical person ?ƚŽďĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?ƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĂůůǇŚĂǀĞ ‘ĂŶ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů ǀĂůƵĞ ǁŚĞŶ ŝƚ ĐŽŵĞƐ ƚŽ ĂŶǇ ƚƌŝĂů ?59 involving an s. 1 offence. 
Significantly, instances of football disorder, a third party not involved in the acts of 
disorder will almost certainly be present in and around the stadium. Although it has 
been noted that football hooligans now organise rival fights away from the stadium 
and out of sight of the police.60 
                                                          
55 Ibid. at 19. 
56 [1989] 88 Cr App R 317 (CA). 58.  
57
 [2005] EWCA Crim 609 (CA). 
58 J. Beggs QC, G.Thomas and S. Rickard, Public Order: Law and Practice (OUP: Oxford, 2012). 
59 Ibid. at 84. 
60 J. Allan, Bloody Casuals: Diary of a Football Hooligan (Famedram Publishers Ltd: Ellon, 1989). 
  
Accordingly, to be liable of the more serious offence of riot contrary to s. 1 of the 
Public Order Act 1986, the prosecution must prove that the accused himself actually 
used rather than merely threatened violence. As illustrated in R v Chapman,61  ‘ŝƚŝƐƚŽ
be made crystal clear to everyone that...each individual who takes an active part by 
deed is guilty of an extremely grave offence by being engaged in a crime against the 
ƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?KĨĨĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚŝƐŶĂƚƵƌĞǁĞƌĞŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĞŶĂĐƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƚĞǁŚĞŶ
considering acts of disorder involving football spectators. Particularly the organisation 
and instigation of violence amongst a collective group of spectators with an affiliation 
to one particular club. 
 
ŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞŐƌŽƵƉƐĞŵďƌŽŝůĞĚŝŶĨŽŽƚďĂůůĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌǁĂƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƐĂǀĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚ
needed to be punished severely.62 With this in mind, L. J. Rose in R v Najeeb & Ors63 
ƐƚŝƉƵůĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶŽďŽĚǇŝƐƚŽďĞƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞĚĨŽƌŵĞƌĞĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŵĞŶƚďǇƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞƚŽ
threaten violence...but measured on principal factors...the duration of his presence 
ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚƵŶůĂǁĨƵůĂĐƚƐŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŚĞĚŝĚǁŚŝůƐƚƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?/n proving that the accused 
himself actually used unlawful violence and the violence of the group was used for a 
common purpose can be quite difficult. Particularly as the prosecution has to show 
that the accused intended violence or were aware that their conduct might be violent. 
The test of the effect on a person of  ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐ ? is the standard of 
 ‘ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌůŝŶĞƐƐ ?64  ? ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ĂƐ Ɛ ?  ? ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƵŶůĂǁĨƵů ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ? ŝƚ
indicates that a person of reasonable firmness would recognise the seriousness of the 
ŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĨĞĂƌĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƐĂĨĞƚǇ ? ‘/ŶƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚŝƐƐĞĞŵƐĂƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ƚŽ ĂƉƉůǇ ?65 to offences of riot and violent disorder, although the law as it 
currently stands does not take into consideration this third-party element. 
 
In the case of R v Muranyi,66 ŝƚǁĂƐŽŶůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝƚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚǁĂƐĂďůĞƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůůǇďǇƚŚĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚ ? ?dŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŶůǇ case concerning riot for 
the purposes of football disorder, involved the defendant taking a leading part in and 
                                                          
61 [2002] EWCA Crim 2346 5. Stated in the Crown Court on 23 November 2001. 
62 See above n. 52. 
63 [2003] EWCA Crim 194 (CA). 
64 R. Costigan and R. Stone, Civil Liberties and Human Rights, 11th edn (OUP: Oxford, 2017) 412. 
65 Ibid. at 412. 
66 [1986] 8 Cr App R (S) 176 (CA). 
 instigating a large-scale riot in which football supporters were attacked. The 24 other 
defendants involved in this case were not prosecuted and it was the evidence 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚDƵƌĂŶǇŝƚŚĂƚ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚŚĞǁĂƐ  ‘ĂĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞƌŽĨĨŽŽƚďĂůů
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝŶŐůĞĂĚĞƌ ? ?67 /ĨƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐ ? ?ŽĨĨĞŶĐĞ
ĐĂŶ  ‘ŝŶĨĞƌƌĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ?68  in the Muranyi case there were more than the 12 
individuals present together for the purpose of the offence. The individuals all had an 
affiliation with the same football club. They were gathered together under a common 
purpose by the organiser to be involved in violence, and that violence was directed 
towards another group of football spectators. Acts of disorder such as this should 
satisfy the offence of riot. However, the difficulty of establishing the intention of each 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŽĨĨĞŶĚĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĚƵct could have on 
the absent, hypothetical third party highlights the impracticality of the law in order to 
secure a conviction. It appears in this case that the court could only interpret the 
wording of s. 1 in line with the organiser of the violence. 
 
Each case regarding incidents of serious public disorder needs to be carefully 
considered on its own facts and merits before deciding the appropriate level of charge 
prosecutors should receive. The actus reus of an individual contrary to both s. 1 and 
s. 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 is based on the nature and effect of the outbreaks of 
violence and lawlessness at the time of disorder. In order to establish the intention of 
an individual, the statutory interpretation of violence with regard to riot and violent 
disorder is illustrated in s. 8 of the Public Order Act 1986. It verifies that any violent 
ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ‘ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐǀŝŽůĞŶƚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĂƐǁĞůůĂƐǀŝŽůĞŶƚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ
persons...and it is not restricted to conduct causing or intended to cause injury or 
ĚĂŵĂŐĞďƵƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌǀŝŽůĞŶƚĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ? ?tŝƚŚƐ ? ?ďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŽĨ
public order offences, charges under s. 1 should only be used for the most serious 
cases usually linked to planned or spontaneous serious outbreaks of sustained 
violence. 69  Similar to the case of Muranyi, a situation that still occurs in around 
football matches in England and Wales on a seasonal basis. 
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68 Public Order Act 1986, s. 1(3). 
69 ƌŝŵĞWƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ‘WƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌKĨĨĞŶĐĞƐŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŚĂƌŐŝŶŐ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ PZŝŽƚ ? ?dŚĞƌŽǁŶWƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?
1 November 2010). Available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/#Riot (accessed 25 October 
2017). 
 dŚĞƌŽǁŶWƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƐŚĂƌŐŝŶŐ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ70 outlines the forms of conduct 
that should fall within the scope of the offence of riot, by introducing five specific 
characteristics. The characteristics, however, make no specific reference to football-
related disorder although the 1986 Act was created on the backdrop of football 
hooliganism in the 1980s. One such charĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐ ĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ŝƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ
scale and ferocity of the disorder whereby severe disruption and fear is caused to 
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ?dŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨĂĐƚŽƌŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚĨŽƌƐŽĐŝĞƚǇƚŽůŝǀĞ
free from fear without criminals breeding fear in residents and leaving destruction in 
ƚŚĞŝƌǁĂŬĞ ? ?71 Although all characteristics in the Charging Standard do not have to be 
considered together to result in a charge of riot, the nature of them are usually 
entwined by the actions of the individuals. For that reason, inciting fear into members 
ŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŝƐĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇ ‘ƚŚĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐĂ
significant impact upon a significant number of non-participants for a significant 
ůĞŶŐƚŚŽĨƚŝŵĞ ? ?72 This significant impact on individuals could be seen to link with the 
 ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐ ?ƚĞƐƚƚŚĂƚŝƐĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇŵŝƐƐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐ ? ?ŽĨĨĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?
the practicality of using these Standards alongside the s. 1 offence will create difficulty 
in convicting a football spectator. 
Riot and Alcohol 
 
The seriousness of the characteristics in the Charging Standard can be completely 
quashed if rioters raise a defence for their actions before the courts. The Public Order 
Act 1986 makes special provision for the possibility of a plea of intoxication. 
A persons whose awareness is impaired by intoxication shall be taken to be 
aware of that of which he be aware if not intoxicated, unless he shows either 
that his intoxication was not self-induced or that it was solely by the taking or 
administration of a substance in the course of medical treatment.73 
&Žƌ ƚŚĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ŽĨ Ɛ ?  ? ? ? ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WƵďůŝĐ KƌĚĞƌ Đƚ ? ? ? ? ?  ‘ŝŶƚŽǆŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŵĞĂŶƐ ĂŶǇ
intoxication, whether caused by drink, drugs or other means or by a combination of 
                                                          
70 ƌŝŵĞWƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?  ‘WƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌKĨĨĞŶĐĞƐ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŚĂƌŐŝŶŐ^ƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?  ?dŚĞƌŽǁŶWƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?  ?
November 2010). Available at: http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/ (accessed 27 October 2017). 
71 HC Deb 11 August 2011, vol. 531, col. 1136. 
72 See above n. 63 at 5. 
73 Public Order Act 1986, s. 6(5). 
 means. 74  Thus, as with other offences where the required mental element is 
ƌĞĐŬůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ ‘ƐĞůĨ-ŝŶĚƵĐĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŽǆŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐŶŽĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƉƵďůŝĐŽƌĚĞƌ
ŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐ ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?  ‘ŚĞ ǁŝůů ďĞ ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ƵŶŝŵƉĂŝƌĞĚ ? ĂƐ ĂǁĂƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŚĞ
would have been aware of had he ŶŽƚďĞĞŶŝŶƚŽǆŝĐĂƚĞĚ ? ?75 There needs to be a degree 
of certainty when drafting the indictment for an s. 1 offence involving intoxication. It 
ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ  ‘ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƵƐĞ ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ
merely being aware that his conduct ŵĂǇ ďĞ ǀŝŽůĞŶƚ ? ?76In doing so, this would be 
alleging a crime of specific intent.77 
 
The possible defence of intoxication for the purposes of s. 1 riot further highlights the 
problem with the wording of the offence, as a person cannot form a common purpose 
ƌĞĐŬůĞƐƐůǇ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŵŽƐƚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚĂŵŽŶŐƐƚĨŽŽƚďĂůůƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐ ?ǁŝƚŚ ‘ĚƌƵŶŬĞŶŶĞƐƐ ?ŽĨ
fans being the most often reported cause of violent disorder by the media.78 Although 
there is much academic research on the link between alcohol consumption and 
football disorder,79 and how intoxication may not be the sole reason for spontaneous 
acts of violence. For the purposes of A s. 1 offence and the possible defence of 
intoxication, there needs to be a clearer explanation of the meaning or common 
purpose to secure a cŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƌŝŽƚ ďǇ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ
ĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŽďĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? 
 
Where there are seemingly spontaneous outbreaks of violence, similar to that 
witnessed amongst football spectators, with different motivations coming into play 
amongst different individuals, the establishment of the common purpose held in the 
offence of riot in s. 1 of the Public Order Act will very much depend on the facts and 
circumstances of any given case. The difficulty of sharing this common purpose with 
at least another 11 people is particularly visible in the defence of intoxication, as 1 
                                                          
74 Ibid. 
75 General principle held in DPP v Majewski [1977] AC 433 (CA). 
76 P. Thornton, The Law of Public Order and Protest (OUP: London, 2010). 
77  Meaning either willingly or knowingly became intoxicated, to which a plea of self-induced intoxication may apply. See W. 
Wilson, Criminal Law, 5th edn (Pearson: London, 2014). 
78  P. Marsh et al., Football Violence in Europe (The Amsterdam Group: Amsterdam, 1996). 
79  See, P. Marsh and S. Frosdick, Football Hooliganism (Willan: Milton, 2005); G. Pearson, An Ethnography of English Football 
&ĂŶƐ P ĂŶƐ ? ŽƉƐ ĂŶĚ ĂƌŶŝǀĂůƐ  ?DĂŶĐŚĞƐƚĞƌ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ WƌĞƐƐ P DĂŶĐŚĞƐƚĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? : ? tŝůůŝĂŵƐ ?  ‘tŚŽ ƌĞ zŽƵ ĂůůŝŶŐ Ă
,ŽŽůŝŐĂŶ ? ?ŝŶD ?WĞƌƌǇŵĂŶ ?ĞĚ ? ?, Hooligan Wars: Causes and Effects of Football Violence (Mainstream: Edinburgh, 2012) pp. 
37 W ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ?^ƚŽƚƚĂŶĚ' ?WĞĂƌƐŽŶ ?&ŽŽƚďĂůů ‘,ŽŽůŝŐĂŶŝƐŵ ? PWŽůŝĐŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞtĂƌŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ŶŐůŝƐŚŝƐĞĂƐĞ ? ?WĞŶŶĂŶƚŽŽŬƐ P
London, 2007). 
 person cannot form a common purpose recklessly. The assumption that alcohol 
consumption is somewhat linked to football disorder80 could provide a reason as to 
why the offence of riot is not utilised by the prosecution. 
 
The levels of intoxication by an individual football supporter may be such as to prevent 
the defendant forming the necessary mens rea of the offence, whereby the individual 
does not have to have foreseen any consequence, or harm, beyond that laid down in 
the definition of the actus reus of the offence. Therefore, including this possible 
defence, and the other elements of the offence of riot being of difficulty to establish, 
prosecutors consider charging individuals with other serious offences of public order, 
notably, violent disorder contrary to s. 2. The Law Commission stated, 
the element of common purpose in the proposed offence of riot amounts in 
substance to a further mental element of intent. We would therefore expect 
that, if there was sufficient evidence to indicate that a defendant accused of 
riot was too intoxicated to have the common purpose, he could not be found 
guilty of riot. Nevertheless, if his intoxication was self-induced, he could be 
convicted as an alternative of violent 
disorder.81 
Riot: The Violent Act 
 
An additional factor regarding s. 1 and s. 2 that is of equal importance, particularly in 
a footballing disorder context, is that only one person need to actually use this 
unlawful violence towards a person or property. Others who may have been 
collectively involved in serious disorder need only threaten unlawful violence, 
meaning, a single person in a disorderly situation can still be charged with riot or 
violent disorder. This could be the underpinning factor to the case of Muranyi; 
however, other individuals who may have been involved in encouraging, planning, 
                                                          
80 ^ĞĞZ ?'ŝƵůŝĂŶŽƚƚŝ ? ‘^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐdĂƌƚĂŶƌŵǇŝŶ/ƚĂůǇ PdŚĞĂƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĂƌŶŝǀĂůĞƐƋƵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůZĞǀŝĞǁ ? ? ? W527; 
Z ? 'ŝƵůŝĂŶŽƚƚŝ ?  ‘&ŽŽƚďĂůů ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ ĂƌŶŝǀĂů P Ŷ ƚŚŶŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ ^ƚƵĚǇ ŽĨ ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ &ĂŶƐ ŝŶ ^ǁĞĚĞŶ ? ?  ? ?  ? ? ?  ? ?
InternatioŶĂůZĞǀŝĞǁĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨ^ƉŽƌƚ ? ? ?<ŝŶŐ ? ‘&ŽŽƚďĂůů&ĂŶĚŽŵĂŶĚWŽƐƚ-ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů/ĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞEĞǁƵƌŽƉĞ ?
(2000) 51 The British Journal of Sociology 419 W ? ? ? ?W ?'ŽǁĂŶĚ: ?ZŽŽŬǁŽŽĚ ? ‘ŽŝŶŐ/ƚĨŽƌƚŚĞdĞĂŵ W Examining the Causes 
of Contemporary EngliƐŚ&ŽŽƚďĂůů,ŽŽůŝŐĂŶŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?:ŽƵƌŶĂůŽĨYƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶ^ƉŽƌƚƐ^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? ? W82. 
81  Law Commission, Criminal Law: Offences Relating to Public Order, Cmnd 9510 (1983) at para. 6.28. 
 directing or coordinating others carrying out the violence can still commit an s.1 or s. 
2 offence by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring and are charged as joint 
principals.82 Although this was not upheld in the Muranyi case, if the courts and the 
wording of the statute provide obstacles to prove the intention of 12 or more persons 
together to uphold a conviction of the s. 1 offence of riot, it is questionable as to how 
the aiders and abetters are not convicted of the three lesser, summary offences in the 
WƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐĨĞĂƌŽƌƉƌŽǀŽĐĂƚŝ ŶŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƐ ?
4;  ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐ ŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚ ? ĂůĂƌŵ Žƌ ĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐ ? ƵŶĚĞƌ Ɛ  ? ? Žƌ  ‘ĐĂƵƐŝŶŐ
ŚĂƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?ĂůĂƌŵŽƌĚŝƐƚƌĞƐƐ ?ŚĞůĚŝŶƐ ? ? ? 
 
In addition to the actus reus of the offences of riot and violent disorder, it is also 
required that there is proof of the mens rea of the accused at the time the offence is 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞWƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌĐƚ ? ? ? ?ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶŝƐŐƵŝůƚǇŽĨ
ƌŝŽƚŽŶůǇŝĨŚĞŝŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŽƵƐĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽƌŝƐĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŵĂǇďĞǀŝŽůĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĂƉĞƌƐŽŶŝƐŐƵŝůƚǇŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶƚĚŝƐŽƌĚer or affray only if he intends to use or threaten 
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽƌŝƐĂǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŵĂǇďĞǀŝŽůĞŶƚŽƌƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽ
s. 6(2). Where football spectators supporting the same football team, gathering 
together at the same time under a common purpose to be involved in violence with a 
rival group of supporters, this should satisfy s. 6(1).  
 
^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚŝŶEĂũĞĞď ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƌĞŐĂ ĚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƐƚŽĨĂ
 “ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŵŝƌƌŽƌƐ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ  “ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ƚĞƐƚƐ ŽĨ
 “ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞŶĞƐƐ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞ 
WƵďůŝĐKƌĚĞƌĐƚ ? ?/ƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ 
a judge is bound to know what the defendant did intend or foresee in terms of 
what they think they must have intended or foreseen, and this in turn is likely 
to influence what ƚŚĞǇƚŚŝŶŬĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚŽƌ
foreseen in those circumstances.83 
Giving that the offences of riot and violent disorder need not have a person of 
reasonable firmness to be present at the scene, the question of conviction then 
becomes a one of proportionality. It is therefore a question for the courts to not cause 
                                                          
82 Ibid. 
83 See above n. 65 at 176. 
 a tension of the construction and interpretation of mens rea, but establish the level 
ŽĨ  ‘ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?84  to ensure the punishment does not supersede the 
offence that has been committed. It appears that the courts do not want to cause this 
tension, therefore rely on convicting under an s. 2 offence of violent disorder. 
 
In view of the other offences against the person or against property that are available 
to use within the English legal system, it is argued whether there would be a significant 
gap in the law if these two offences did not exist.85 With existing offences which could 
be used to criminalise individuals for the destruction of property, that is, Criminal 
Damage Act 1971,86 >ŽƌĚŝƉůŽĐŬŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŶĞĞĚĨŽƌ ‘ŚŝŐŚĞƌůĞŐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ
for the power to arrest as well as a large range of powers to deal with these breaches 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ? ?87  The Law Commission 88  in 1983 had the view that there is certain 
 ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐƚŽŵŽďǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽƌƚŚƌĞĂƚƐǁŚŝĐŚŝĨĞǆƉŽƐĞĚƚŽŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ
ĐĂŶŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĂƐĞŶƐĞŽĨƵŶĞĂƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌƐĂĨĞƚǇ ? ?dŚŝƐďĞŝŶŐĂĨĂĐƚŽƌƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶĞĚ
the creation of factor underpinning the creation of the 1986 Act due to the number of 
outbreaks of violence in the early 1980s and the behaviour of English football 
ƐƉĞĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŽǀĞƌƐĞĂƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞĨŝƌŵŶĞƐƐ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚůŝ ŬĞĚƚŽĂƚŚŝƌĚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐ ?
members of the public, is absent from the offences of riot and violent disorder. As 
ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚďǇ >ŽƌĚ ^ĐĂƌŵĂŶ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ  ‘ƉƌĞĨĞƌĂďůĞ ? ?89 not essential, for these offences of 
public order to be in place. For that reason, s. 1 of the Public Order 1986 may have 
been included to create a sense of ease around public safety at that time, rather than 
being a practical mechanism. 
Conclusion 
 
It has been illustrated that s. 1 is a vague instrument that had been drafted swiftly in 
the attempt to manage serious public disorder. Consequently, the courts hesitatingly 
use this offence to raise a conviction at times of football violence and disorder. The 
view of the characteristics in s. 1 poses challenges in upholding sufficient evidence 
                                                          
84 Ibid. at 179. 
85 R. Card, Public Order Law (Jordans: Bristol, 2000) 56. 
86 Section 1, damage to property without lawful excuse. 
87 Albert v Lavin [1982] AC 546. 
88 See above n. 83. 
89 See above n. 12 at 507. 
 from those whose duties are preventing, prosecuting and judging the offence in 
question. 
It has been demonstrated that the scope of s. 1 to uphold convictions requires 
enhanced clarity regarding the wording and structure of the offence. It is sensible to 
retain the hierarchical nature of ss 1 W3, nevertheless in order to secure a conviction 
of riot, when incidents of such nature do occur involving football violence, there is a 
need to provide clarity of the fundamental factors underpinning the offence. 
 
The need for 12 or more persons causes considerable difficulty in being able to 
prosecute. The previous offence of riot provided the presence of three or more people 
was necessary. Although the offence by virtue of the 1986 Act was introduced to 
ĐŽŵďĂƚ  ‘ǁŝĚĞ-spread and large-ƐĐĂůĞ ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ ? ?90 the charge must be considered 
within the public interest. Football banning order and arrest statistics are released 
each season with the purpose of notifying the public of the attempts to curtail football 
violence and disorder. The purpose of these orders is to identify individuals whom 
pose a potential risk to public safety in connection with a regulated football match. It 
is apparent that the public, alongside the relevant authorities, take considerable 
interest in acts of football violence and disorder and how this can be prevented and 
prosecuted. 
 
A football banning order can be served on conviction of a relevant offence.91 An s. 1 
offence of riot is considered relevant by virtue of Schedule 1 of the Football Spectators 
Act 1989. An individual convicted of this offence can receive a maximum penalty of 10 
ǇĞĂƌƐ ? ŝŵƉƌŝƐŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? /Ĩ ĂŶ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚual were to receive this penalty, the longer the 
duration the football banning order can be.92 It is advisable that the offence of riot 
should involve six or more persons to be present, particularly in the context of football 
violence. Groups of football fans usually involve two distinct fan groups; therefore, 
collectively, under the new proposition, there could still be more than 12 persons 
present. This would increase the likelihood of securing a conviction and satisfying the 
public interest surrounding the curtailment of football violence and disorder. 
 
                                                          
90 See above n. 19 at 325. 
91 Football Spectators Act 1989, s. 14(1). 
92 Football ^ƉĞĐƚĂƚŽƌƐĐƚ  ? ? ? ? ? Ɛ ?  ? ? ?& ? ? ? ?  ‘ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŽƌĚĞƌ ŝƐŵĂĚĞ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ  ? ? ĂďŽǀĞ ŝŶ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ Ă ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ
ŝŵƉƌŝƐŽŶŵĞŶƚƚĂŬŝŶŐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞŵĂǆŝŵƵŵŝƐƚĞŶǇĞĂƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŵŝŶŝŵƵŵŝƐƐŝǆǇĞĂƌƐ ? ? 
 In consideration of the public interest element of the conviction, it would be 
advantageous to also necessitate a reasonable person to be present at the scene in 
the wording of the offence. By introducing a reasonable firmness test to establish fear 
ĨƌŽŵĂŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂůƉĞƌƐŽŶƐ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŝƚŝƐĂƐƚƌĂŶŐĞŽŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐĂďƐĞŶƚ
from the offence, particularly in terms of football violence and disorder. If a conviction 
of an s. 1 offence must be within the public interest, it surely must be necessary to 
establish whether or not the offence itself would create fear in the reasonable 
bystander. 
 
Finally, the common purpose element of the offence also needs particular 
consideration. It is possible to refer to the Field v Receiver case to determine how 
 ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĂƐƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŽŶůĂǁƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨ
 ‘ďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞ ?ŝƐƐƚŝůůƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌƐ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞ
a reasonable ground to apprehend a breach of the peace, and as riot is an unlawful 
ĂƐƐĞŵďůǇǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞŐƵŶƚŽĞǆĞĐƵƚĞŝƚƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞďǇĂďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞƉĞĂĐĞ ? ?93 
The initial gathering of the individuals and the commencement or instigation of a 
breach of the peace could help establish the formation of the riot and whether there 
was a common purpose amongst the 12 individuals. Within the context of football 
violence and disorder, it could aid in the establishment of whether the groups of 
football spectators were gathered with a common purpose to be involved in violence 
and disorder. 
 
It is therefore proposed that the s. 1 offence of riot housed in the Public Order 1986 
to decrease the number of persons present from 12 to 6 and to establish the common 
purpose of these individuals by utilising the assessment provided in the case of Field. 
To uphold a charge of riot, there also needs to be the inclusion of the reasonable 
firmness test that is included in other public order offences. With this change, it would 
be interesting to see whether there would be the inclusion of this offence within the 
annual release of football banning order and arrest statistics. 
 
                                                          
93 See above n. 37 at 861. 
